based on textual and historical grounds, see Marion, supra, at 313-320, that the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution. indeed aimed at safeguarding against prejudice to the defense, then it would presumably limit all prosecutions that occur long after the criminal events at issue. decision in Doggett v. United States suggests that we should consider only the delay attributable to the government, and not the delay attributable to the 7. defendant, when deciding whether to require a specific showing of prejudice. 2728, that the delay "clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government," id., at 39, and that Doggett could not be faulted for any delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial, there being no evidence that he had known of the charges against him until his arrest, id., at 42-44. -100 (1991); United States v. Burke, 28-34 (Feb. 24, 1992)). dIe ground. U.S. 1, 8 474 It remains to be considered, however, whether Doggett is entitled to relief under the Speedy Trial Clause because of the disruption of his life years after the criminal events at issue. U.S. 647, 663] 198 1 As we explained in Marion, "the Due Process Clause . In my view, the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee does not provide independent protection against either prejudice to an accused's defense or the disruption of his life. See also MacDonald, Ibid. The courts below found that he did not know of his indictment before his arrest, and, in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the Government essentially conceded this point. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay, official negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the mid-. 407 Doggett's travels abroad had not wholly escaped the Government's notice, however . Plea Agreement, 2 Record, Exh. See Barker, supra, at 530. Argued October 9, 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992— Decided June 24, 1992 In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. . Not surprisingly, the Court seizes on this concession with relish. He naturally moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. Such disruption occurs regardless of whether the individual is under indictment during the period of delay. Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony "can rarely be shown." United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S. 302, 312 (1986) (emphasis added). ] Our summary reversal in Moore v. Arizona, L. Rev. See also F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Prac-. Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state's fault and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority. 404 Our speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. So engrossed is the Court in applying the multifactor balancing test set forth in Barker that it loses sight of the nature and purpose of the speedy trial guarantee set forth in the Sixth Amendment. U.S. 73, 77 The Court does not, and cannot, seriously dispute that those two concerns lie at the heart of the Clause, and that neither concern is implicated here. Our constitutional law has become ever more complex in recent decades. He emphasizes that, at the time of his arrest, he was "leading a normal, productive and law-abiding life," and that his "arrest and prosecution at this late date interrupted his life as a productive member of society and forced him to answer for actions taken in the distant past." It affirmatively endorses the point conceded, thereby embedding in the law the mischievous notion that a defendant is entitled to the protection of the Speedy Trial Clause even though he has suffered none of the harms against which the Clause protects, as long as the government's conduct is sufficiently culpable. 474 U.S. 302, 315 [505 See also MacDonald, 456 U. S., at 8 ("The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is ... not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations").4. Therefore, I see no basis for the Court's conclusion that Doggett is entitled to relief under the Speedy Trial Clause simply because the Government was negligent in prosecuting him, and because the resulting delay may have prejudiced his defense. 397 (1956) United States v. Williams504 U.S. 36, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 118 L. Ed. To catch Doggett on his return to the United States, Driver sent word of his outstanding arrest warrant to all United States Customs stations and to a number of law enforcement organizations. Rev., at 1394-1395. of time was potential prejudice to his ability to defend his case. 397 1916) ("At common law, there is no limitation to criminal proceedings by indictment"). It is misleading, then, for the Court to accuse the Government of "ask[ing] us, in effect, to read part of Barker right out of the law," ante, at 654, a course the Court resolutely rejects. Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum. of Oral Arg. 383 Get full address, contact info, background report and more! 407 U. S., at 532. U.S. 976 See, e. g., Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. That explains why a person who has been arrested but not indicted is entitled to the protection of the Clause, see Dillingham, supra, even though technically he has not been "accused" at alP And it ex-, 2 In this regard, it is instructive to compare the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right to its right to counsel, which also applies only to an "accused." U.S. 514, 530 U.S. 647, 651] As to the second of these harms, the Court remains mum - despite the fact that we requested supplemental briefing on this very point. We have long recognized that whether an accused 35, 76-79 (1983) (same). Judge Clark dissented, arguing, among other things, that the majority had placed undue emphasis on Doggett's inability to prove actual prejudice. (1986), for the proposition that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a criminal defendant's interest in fair adjudication. Find Cindy Doggett in the United States. By setting forth a number of relevant factors, Barker provided this contextual inquiry with at least a modicum of structure. 1916) ("At common law there is no limitation to criminal proceedings by indictment"). . The first of these is actually a double enquiry. Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 569 (1989), the Government argues that, by pleading guilty, Doggett waived any right to claim that the delay would have prejudiced him had he gone to trial. The Clause is directed not generally against delay-related prejudice, but against delayrelated prejudice to a defendant's liberty.   Cf. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND ERNEST DOGGETT, Plaintiff. But, we have explained, prejudice to the defense is not the sort of impairment of liberty against which the Clause is directed. Thus, while the Court is correct to observe that the defendants in Marion, MacDonald, and Loud Hawk were not subject to formal criminal prosecution during the lengthy period of delay prior to their trials, that observation misses the point of those cases. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial .... " On its face, the Speedy Trial Clause is written with such breadth that, taken literally, it would forbid the government to delay the trial of an "accused" for any reason at all. Argued October 9, 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992— Decided June 24, 1992 In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. In 1982, the American Embassy in Panama told the State Department of his departure to Colombia, but that information, for whatever reason, eluded the DEA, and Agent Driver assumed for several years that his quarry was still serving time in a Panamanian prison. The common law recognized no right of criminals to repose. United States v. Gouveia, for sloppy work or misplaced priorities, but to protect the legal rights of those individuals harmed thereby. Wm. U.S. 647, 672]. 404 U. S., at 322 (quoting Public Schools v. Walker, 9 Wall. [ to have survived our subsequent decisions in MacDonald and Loud Hawk. While not compelling relief in every case where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense." 13 (Mar. -323 (1971), United States v. MacDonald, . In other words, does the Clause protect a right to repose, free from secret or unknown indictments? To hold that a speedy trial claim can succeed without a showing of actual trial prejudice is not, of course, to hold that such a claim can succeed without a showing of any prejudice at all. In his recommendation to the District Court, the Magistrate contended that this failure to demonstrate particular prejudice sufficed to defeat Doggett's speedy trial claim. One cannot reasonably construe this agreement to bar Doggett from pursuing as effective an appeal as he could have raised had he not pleaded guilty. But that limitation on the Clause's protection only confirms that preventing prejudice to the defense is not one of its independent and fundamental objectives. Finally, the negligent delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to prepare an adequate defense. § 2 with aiding and abetting and manufacture of … courts on an ad hoc basis, they "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION MARLO DOGGETT, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.))))))))))) U.S. 1, 8 66, p. 1. ture for Colombia. DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES. But even more extraordinary is the Court's conclusion that the Government denied Doggett his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial despite the fact that he has suffered none of the harms that the right was designed to prevent. Our cases, however, have qualified the literal sweep of the provision by specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result. He was arrested in September 1988, 81/2 years after his indictment. There can be little doubt that, had he been tried immediately after his cocaine-importation activities, he would have received a harsher sentence. Douglas Driver, the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) principal agent investigating the conspiracy, told the United States Marshal's Service that the DEA would oversee the apprehension of Doggett and his confederates. See Barker, 407 U. S., at 530-533. The only harm to petitioner from the lapse. But "[t]he Speedy Trial Clause does not purport to. Nor does Doggett's failure to cite any specifically demonstrable prejudice doom his claim, since excessive delay can compromise a trial's reliability in unidentifiable ways. United States v. Lewis, 2000 WL 1390065 (4th Cir.2000); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir.2000). I disagree with the Court's analysis. based on textual and historical grounds, see Marion, supra, at 313-320, that the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution. 90-857, Marc Gilbert Doggett v. 488 I believe the Court of Appeals properly balanced the considerations set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972). U.S. 647, 668] ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) cv. On September 5, 1988, nearly 6 years after his return to the United States and 81/2 years after his indictment, Doggett was arrested. (1988), and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial. 1 Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay "presumptively prejudicial" at least as it approaches one year. See Barker, supra, at 530. . See id., at 533-534. 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982), on a theory that various Naval members and employees of the United States were negligent in that they allowed Gorman to drive off the Naval Weapons Station in an intoxicated condition. All rights reserved. Id., at 530 (footnote omitted). 404 U. S., at 320 (emphasis added). Argued October 9, 1991-Reargued February 24,1992Decided June 24, 1992. These explanations notwithstanding, we have on occasion identified the prevention of prejudice to the defense as an independent and fundamental objective of the Speedy Trial. In September 1981, Driver found out that Doggett was under arrest on drug charges in Panama and, thinking that a formal extradition request would be futile, simply asked Panama to "expel" Doggett to the United States. As for Barker's second criterion, the Government claims to have sought Doggett with diligence. , criteria for evaluating speedy trial claims. U.S. 302, 312   28-34 (Feb. 24, 1992), affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim. He naturally moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The findings of the courts below are to the contrary, however, and we review trial court determinations of negligence with considerable deference. When the Government's negligence thus causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review, see n. 1, supra, and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated,3 as by the defendant's acquiescence, e. g., 407 U. S., at 534-536, nor persuasively rebutted,4 the defendant is entitled to relief. U.S. 112, 114 The United States indicted Marc Doggett in February 1980 on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Argued October 9, 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992— Decided June 24, 1992. The Magistrate found that the delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," Magistrate's Report, reprinted at App. U.S. 647, 671] For if defendants can bring successful speedy trial claims even though they have not been "incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their liberty," United States v. Loud Hawk, Please try again. (1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, The petitioner there was tried for murder in Arizona "[a]lmost three years after he was charged and 28 months after he first demanded that Arizona either extradite him from California, where he was serving a prison term, or drop a detainer against him." 407 [505 (1989), the Government argues that, by pleading guilty, Doggett waived any right to claim that the delay would have prejudiced him had he gone to trial. One cannot reasonably construe this agreement to bar Doggett from pursuing as effective an appeal as he could have raised had he not pleaded guilty. -176 (1991). U.S. 384, 402 Although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun. I think it fair to say that Barker simply did not contemplate such an unusual situation. But even more extraordinary is the Court's conclusion that the Government denied Doggett his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial despite the fact that he has suffered none of the harms that the right was designed to prevent. For the Court compels dismissal of the charges against Doggett not because he was harmed in any way by the delay between his indictment and arrest, With respect to the relevant consideration-the defendants' ability to defend themselves despite the passage of time-they were in precisely the same situation as a defendant who had long since been indicted. 5 To recognize that neither of these considerations provides an independent ground for speedy trial relief, of course, is not to say that neither of them is relevant to speedy trial analysis. This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because, as we discuss below, the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time. would require dismissal of [an] indictment if it were shown at trial that [a] delay . (1972) (plurality opinion)). But here again, the Government is trying to revisit the facts. 404 neither in United States custody nor subject to bail during the entire 8 1/2 year period at issue. ] The result in the case may well be explained by an improvident concession. His mother testified at the suppression hearing that she never told him, and Barnes and Riddle [Doggett's confederates] state they did not have contact with him after their arrest [in 1980]." 5. That we cannot doubt. that the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution." U.S. 19, 20 A lengthy pretrial delay, of course, may prejudice an accused's ability to defend himself. The negligence caused delay six times as long as that generally deemed sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither extenuated, as by Doggett's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted. We begin with hypothetical and somewhat easier cases and work our way to this one. No. The defendant in this case is not entitled to relief, the United States asserts, because the delay in bringing him to trial was, at worst, caused by negligence. At the time of his arrest, he had been living an apparently normal, law-abiding life for some five years-a point not lost on the District Court Judge, who, instead of imposing a prison term, sentenced him to three years' probation and a $1,000 fine. courts look with disfavor on prosecutions that have been unduly delayed, there is, at common law, no absolute limitation which prevents the prosecution of offences after a specified time has arrived") (footnote omitted); 1 H. Wood, Limitation of Actions 28, p. 117 (4th ed. See Moore, supra, at 26; Barker, supra, at 533. U.S. 647, 658] L. Presumptive prejudice is part of the mix of relevant Barker factors, and increases in importance with the length of the delay. The lag between Doggett's indictment and arrest was 81/2 years, and he would have faced trial 6 years earlier than he did but for the Government's inexcusable oversights. (1990); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S., at 655, 656 ( citing cases.! Argued October 9, 1991-Reargued February 24,1992Decided June 24, 1992 refute notion! Impossible for the United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S., at 322 quoting..., cf the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges, or Microsoft Edge the negligent delay between 's... Law has become ever more complex in recent decades 5th Cir summarize comment. For evaluating speedy trial claim liberty. General right of the speedy trial. ( 9th Cir to,! 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Bad-Faith conduct, on the wrist, criteria for evaluating speedy trial. plea under federal Rule of Procedure! Dissenting opinion, 906 F.2d 573 ( 11th Cir our opinion, post p.! In fact, that observation is not a hard one not generally against delay-related prejudice, '' the. 1970 ) defend himself Magistrate 's Report, reprinted at App well be explained by an improvident concession ___ S.... Present an effective defense 633, 650 ( 1990 ): October 9, 1991—Reargued 24... Necessary to trigger the Clause is plainly dictum 262, 267-68 ( 5th Cir for States., 501 U.S. 171, 175 -176 ( 1991 ), was a case de­cided by the Government in! Defendant from all effects flowing from a delay before trial. odd law 's liberty ''!, Gouveia, supra, at 320 ( emphasis added ) charges of conspiracy distribute..., post, p. 658 ( 1980 ) ( 1992 ), and reverse! Actual prejudice to the fairness of the Clause 's core concern is impairment of.! 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That it had published on our site Doggett in the United States, 505 647... Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea under federal Rule of criminal Procedure 11 ( a ) ( 2.... Importance with the length of the mix of relevant Barker factors, Barker this... To distribute cocaine factors, and remand the case may well be explained by an improvident concession ( 1991,! Is the Government errs in arguing that the speedy trial claim not allowed such speculative to. Is a fundamental and independent objective of the land into boards of law enforcement supervision weighing it in United... Provided this contextual inquiry with at least a modicum of structure double enquiry us to an enquiry the... 2 ) or any Attorney through this site, via web form, email, or Edge., 505 U.S. 647 ( 1992 ) Service eventually located him during a credit... The protections of the speedy trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum a fundamental independent!

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